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See the Comment to WPIC 86.02 (Threatening to Bomb or Injure Property—Elements). Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712, 862 P.2d 117 (1993)); threats to bomb a government building (State v. For example, a superior court judge who neglects to file his or her oath of office with the Secretary of State is still a “public servant,” because filing the oath is not a condition precedent for assuming the duties of office. He was better than me at everything: fighting, hunting, and riding...
Select from among the bracketed phrases so as to use only those that apply to the particular case. A statement may constitute a threat even if it does not actually reach the victim. Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712, 717–18, 862 P.2d 117 (1993)Use of the second bracketed phrase is proper in a prosecution under RCW 9.61.160, threatening to bomb or injure property. Anton Laurens Knappert (Court Appointed), Law Office of Wecker Hunko, Port Orchard, for Appellant. At trial, Knowles moved to dismiss, arguing that the intimidating statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. Rather, he argues that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and violates the free speech protections of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Similarly, in Stephenson, the threats were of a financial and business nature and, therefore, not “true threats.” Stephenson, 89 Wash. Similarly, the definition of “threat” in RCW 9A.04.110(25)(d) and (j) encompasses both protected and unprotected speech. Similarly, subsection (d) (“threats to institute criminal charges”) potentially burdens a substantial amount of protected speech because it prohibits “a wide range of communications beyond mere fighting words and other non-protected speech.” Ivan, 71 Wash. On April 8, 1996, the State charged Knowles by amended information with four counts of intimidating a judge, in violation of RCW 9A.72.160 and RCW 9A.04.110(25)(d) and (j), and one count of barratry, in violation of RCW 9.12.010. On appeal, Knowles does not argue that his acts did not violate the statute. Rather he threatened the judges with financial or personal harm, including the filing of criminal charges, but did not threaten their physical safety. There we ruled: “Consequently, the definition of threat in RCW 9A.04.110(25)(j) encompasses both protected and unprotected speech, and Stephenson's [threat] was entitled to some First Amendment protection.” Stephenson, 89 Wash. at 801, 950 P.2d 38 (citing Khorrami, 895 F.2d at 1192). In Stephenson we determined that RCW 9A.04.110(25)(j) (“harm”), did burden a “real and substantial” amount of protected speech. But RCW 9A.72.160 criminalizes such threatening speech only if used to attempt to influence a judge's ruling or in retaliation for a past ruling. Constitutionally Permissible Prohibition In some circumstances, the government may regulate protected speech. “[E]ven protected speech may be regulated by view-point neutral, reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.” Ivan, 71 Wash. Johnston, 156 Wn.2d 355, 127 P.3d 707 (2006)); threats involved in intimidating a judge (State v. 45, 966 P.2d 411 (1998)); and threats involved in intimidating a public servant (State v.
The constitution requires the prosecution to prove a true threat for many offenses, including: felony harassment involving a threat to kill (see cases cited earlier in this section); threats to bomb or injure property (see State v. “Overbreadth analysis is intended to ensure that legislative enactments do not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, such as free speech.” City of Seattle v.